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Abstract When information is available about the path, on which individual items
move through the real world, many beneficial applications can be designed. The nec-
essary data can be generated through attaching identifiers to items and deploying suit-
able readers all over the supply chain that capture the information on the identifiers.
Organizations only have access to data about item movements within their organiza-
tional boundaries. Therefore sharing of data between organizations is required to gain
full visibility. However, the willingness of organizations to share data is considered
to be low. In this paper we present the results of a study that aimed at investigat-
ing the actual willingness of companies to share item-level data and at exploring the
perceived privacy risks that may restrain companies from sharing item-level data.
From the findings, requirements for the design of inter-organizational data sharing
infrastructures are derived.
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1 Introduction
The Internet is extending its reach to the real world through integration of technolo-
gies such as radio frequency identification (RFID), wireless sensor and actuator net-
works, and networked embedded devices. An electronic network between physical
objects that connects the physical and the digital world is termed as the Internet of
Things [1]. The unique identification of single objects via unique serial numbers,
e.g. the electronic product code (EPC), sophisticated identification technologies, e.g.
RFID or 2D barcodes, and a network infrastructure, e.g. the EPCglobal network, en-
able tracking and tracing of product movements through the supply chain in form
of item-level event data [2]. Event data refers to any kind of time-stamped data that
was captured during a product’s flow through the supply chain. In contrast to the cur-
rent information processing paradigm, which only addresses product types, item-level
refers to a granularity level at which each product is labeled with a unique identifier
that allows addressing of each item individually. The Internet of Things’ concept
comprises that information about items is stored locally at the organizations which
have captured the information and, if required, is then distributed across the supply
chain via a tracking infrastructure [3, 4].
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) includes the electronic trade of physical
and intangible goods like information. It also comprises meta-services that enable
other types of e-commerce like electronic support for collaboration between busi-
nesses [5]. There are different natures of e-commerce like business-to-consumer
(B2C), business-to-business (B2B), or administration-to-business. The B2C dimen-
sion of e-commerce refers mainly to purchasing goods over (cf. online shopping)
and consuming services directly on (cf. online banking) the Internet. This aspect of
e-commerce gained the most public attention, while the B2B potential of e-commerce
seems less appreciated by a broad publicity. The B2B aspect is characterized by the
use of the Internet to facilitate business, e.g. to exchange financial data [5]. Data
sharing and data security are prerequisites for any e-commerce service or meta-
service especially from a B2B perspective and in supply chains, in which various
entities need to cooperate with each other. The benefits and the importance of inter-
organizationally shared event data at item-level become evident when considering the
current situation, i.e. an insufficient or nonexistent tracking infrastructure: the coor-
dination in the supply chain is error-prone and time-consuming, which might lead to
a high level of inventory, high labor cost, and stock outs. The sharing of item-level
event data offers many benefits, including precise tracking and tracing of products [3]
which is important for the generation of electronic pedigrees [6], enables targeted re-
calls [3], or improved vendor managed inventory and continuous replenishment pro-
grams [2]. Further expected benefits include automated counterfeit detection, fewer
out-of-stocks, identification of shrinkage, and theft detection [7]. Tracking based ap-
plications that rely on inter-organizational data sharing have also been devised for
many different industries, e.g. aerospace, automotive, consumer goods, and the phar-
maceutical industry [6, 8–10]. On the basis of shared item-level event data even new
e-commerce business opportunities can arise, like anti-counterfeiting services or ser-
vices to ensure supply chain integrity by complying with regulations imposed by
external authorities (e.g. legal, tax, and transport).
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Despite all the potential benefits, however, tracking based applications are not
yet a reality in an inter-organizational context. This is partly due to the fact that the
infrastructure needed to capture and distribute item-level data has not been fully de-
veloped yet. Additionally, it is reported that companies are reluctant to share item-
level data with their business partners, competitors and organizations unknown to
them [8, 11]. Particularly privacy risks, which go along with shared event data, are
suited to restrain enterprises’ willingness to share item-level event data across the
supply chain. It is not well understood what the exact nature of these privacy risks
is. However, understanding the risks perceived by companies is a prerequisite for
designing measures that mitigate the risks and thus allow the realization of tracking
based applications. Only if the privacy requirements of companies are addressed in
an appropriate way, the vision of the Internet of Things can become reality.
The research presented in this paper thus has three major objectives: (1) to ver-
ify whether the willingness is indeed as low as suggested in literature, we aim at
describing the current sharing behavior and general willingness to share in selected
companies, (2) the description of risks perceived by companies and the impact of
these risks on the willingness to share data, (3) the elicitation of requirements for
designing risk mitigating measures. To achieve the first two objectives, an empirical
study was conducted, in which interviews with 16 experts from various industries
were performed to assess their current sharing behavior, their willingness to share,
and the perceived negative consequences of data sharing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: after reviewing related work,
the methodology of the study is presented. Next, the study results with regard to
the current sharing behavior of participating companies as well as their willingness
to share data are described. Privacy risks that may impact an organizations’ sharing
behavior are described and their impact on the willingness to share data assessed.
The implications for the design of inter-organizational tracking based applications
are discussed before concluding and giving an outlook on future research.
2 Related work
A lot of authors already engaged in inter-organizational data sharing and several stud-
ies claimed data sharing as basis of efficient coordination and source of performance
in supply chains [12–14]. In conventional stock-keeping, management information
is prevalently shared only one stage up or down the supply chain [14–16]. In Ven-
dor Managed Inventory and Continuous Replenishment Programs data is shared with
multiple stages in the supply chains but is restricted to information about the level of
stock or demand forecasts [14]. Lee and Whang state that IT advancements have a
great impact on the development of supply chains [14]. In order to effectively man-
age product movements, diverse technologies like the Internet, Enterprise Resource
Planning systems, or Advanced Planning systems are deployed [14, 17]. Literature
on data sharing, however, is limited when it comes to sharing of fine-granular data.
Although it is understood that the reluctance to share fine-granular data might hamper
the adoption of tracking infrastructures and tracking based applications, only few pos-
sible explanations for the reluctance to share item-level event data exist. Privacy risks
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were identified as a main factor affecting companies’ willingness to share item-level
data [11, 18, 19]. The willingness to share data is lower the more expected negative
consequences of a potential risk are realized. In extreme cases potential risks might
even prevent companies from sharing any data at all.
The project “Building Radio Frequency IDentification for the Global Environ-
ment” (BRIDGE) project aims at investigating the potential of applications based on
item-level data [20]. A study conducted within this project has investigated which
kind of information organizations would be willing to share in a tracking-enabled
environment and under which conditions. The results indicate that organizations are
reluctant to share location information. Most companies are only willing to share
information on a contractual basis, i.e. with companies that are known to them and
with which clear agreements are met on what type of information is shared and under
which conditions. According to a study of the BRIDGE project organizations in the
automotive industry seem reluctant to shared item-level data. They would only share
data which is absolutely necessary for a track-and-trace application with close busi-
ness partners. However, several participants of the BRIDGE study in the automotive
industry could not yet estimate the extent to which item-level data would be shared.
By contrast, data would be shared with business partners to enable product tracking
applications in the consumer goods industry. Information that may be shared includes
pallet identification numbers and dispatch advices. Organizations in the aviation in-
dustry were found to be more likely to share item-level data in the study. Companies
would share product’s lifecycle data with other partners. In the pharmaceutical in-
dustry relevant product information data would be shared in case that a pedigree is
required. Information would be made accessible downstream. Overall, the study sug-
gests that data sharing should be limited to a specific set of applications and data
should only be used for a predefined purpose [8, 21].
Trust has been found to be a relevant factor to predict data sharing behavior in sup-
ply chains, albeit previous studies have not dealt with trust issues related to the shar-
ing of item-level data [22–25]. Trust is a decisive and important element of business
relationships in supply chains [14, 22]. According to a study of the BRIDGE project,
trust is crucial in parties that use a track and trace system to authenticate products [8].
Kumar states that information can only be shared in settings, in which all involved
parties trust each other [23]. Chopra and Meindl claim that managers are more likely
to share information if organizations in the supply chain trust each other [17]. Yang
and Jarvenpaa deem trust vital to foster cooperative behavior [25]. Trust can also
help reducing costs, e.g. by reducing or even avoiding the same tests at incoming and
outgoing goods inspection [23]. Moreover, a trustful business relationship tends to
save transaction costs between two stages of a supply chain [17]. Therefore trust may
also have an indirect impact on an organization’s willingness to share data, namely
via its cost-benefit-ratio. The relevance of trust has been discussed in the context of
the game theory [26] and psychological investigations on so-called social dilemmas
[24, 27, 28]. In addition to trust, dependencies to other organizations and power have
been found to affect organizations willingness to share data [29]. Power is understood
as the enacted trading partner power [30]. These factors were identified as decisive
to determine the extent of shared data [29–32]. In supply chains, in which a power-
ful company forces its business partners to share data, trust has a lower effect on the
willingness to share data than in supply chains with a more balanced power situation.
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3 Methodology
By the means of the literature review, as described in Sect. 2, theories have been
recognized that can partially explain the nature of data sharing, e.g. the “Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior” [26] or the “Tragedy of the Commons” [28]. The
literature review provides an overview of recent and relevant work, and it presents
insights into business rationales, motivations and barriers to engage in data sharing
in supply chains. The last paragraph of Sect. 2 is dedicated to the relevance of trust,
which was found to be a decisive factor in regard to data sharing. The literature re-
view, however, revealed that little work has been done so far to identify and assess
risks that are associated with data sharing. There is hardly any literature that assesses
data sharing on an item level and most literature is on a more general level. The latest
advances of the Internet of Things, data sharing on item-level, and the consequent
perceived privacy risks have not sufficiently been taken into account so far, causing
a gap in the existing literature. As distinguished from the related work (Sect. 2; ex-
cept for the work undertaken in the context of the BRIDGE project perhaps), we put
a particular emphasis on those two points in our qualitative research. The research
process is based on Bryman and Teevan [33]: To collect data, in-depth phone in-
terviews that were guided by a semi-structured questionnaire with 16 experts from
the industry were conducted. The willingness to share item-level event data was as-
sessed by open questions about companies’ current sharing behavior, their overall
willingness to share, with whom they share, which data they share, and under which
circumstances they share event data. Potential privacy risk scenarios were derived
from literature and the experts were asked to assess these threats and their impact on
data sharing. In order to identify further risks not mentioned in literature so far, the in-
terviewees were asked for their expertise. One interviewee could only be interviewed
about potential privacy risks and not about the level of actual sharing behavior and
willingness to share. Furthermore, the interviewees were asked to describe the supply
chain they are part of, including its size, complexity, level of trust, knowledge about
other participants, and power balance.
In total, 16 interviews with organizations from Belgium, Germany, Switzerland
and the USA took place. The experts targeted are key personnel in charge of lo-
gistics or data sharing in the supply chain. Four different industries were covered:
automotive (6 participants), consumer goods (4 participants), electronics, machinery
and factory construction (3 participants), and the pharmaceutical industry (3 partici-
pants). By targeting diverse industries that operate under different conditions, it was
intended to gain a broad understanding of perceived risks and to explore whether
data sharing obstacles are comparable or largely diverse across industries. These in-
dustries were also targeted because there is an indication that tracking and tracking
based applications could be adopted by them in the future. The automotive industry
is affected by counterfeiting [8] and characterized by long and diverse supply chains.
The same applies to the supply chains in the electronics, machinery and factory con-
struction industry. Furthermore, many machines can be considered expensive enough
to justify the costs for an identification technology and the necessary tracking in-
frastructure. The consumer goods industry was selected due to its cutting edge use
of RFID research and applications [9]. The pharmaceutical industry was included
mainly because of electronic pedigree acts in some countries [6].
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4 Willingness to share data and sharing risks
In this section, the major results of the data analysis are presented: (Sect. 4.1) descrip-
tion of the current sharing situation and organizations’ willingness to share item-level
event data, (Sect. 4.2) perceived risks with regard to privacy.
4.1 Willingness to share item-level event data
This subsection is organized as follows: in Sect. 4.1.1 the actual sharing of event data
at item-level is presented, while Sect. 4.1.2 refers to the willingness to share item-
level event data. It concludes with a short summary and an interpretation of the data
(Sect. 4.1.3).
4.1.1 Actual sharing of event data at item-level
The extent of the current sharing behavior of an organization was assessed by regard-
ing the following aspects: whether companies share item level data at all, the number
of business partners with which data is shared, and the type of data that are shared.
Organizations showing similar sharing behaviors were grouped together (Table 1).
Only 4 respondents (27%) stated that their organization currently shared item level
data. In one case, item level data will have to be shared soon as a more powerful
business partner urged data sharing. The organizations that shared only some data
limited the sharing to selected data types, selected items or selected partners within
the supply chain. The organizations that shared data to some extent typically reported
of having a close and trustful relationship with their suppliers and sub-suppliers. They
are part of smaller supply chains, in which most of the other organizations are known.
The group of companies that shared no item-level data at all includes all interviewed
companies from the pharmaceutical industry as well as all companies in the sample
of companies with many suppliers and customers and which are part of large supply
chains.
4.1.2 Willingness to share event data at item-level
The willingness to share data must be distinguished from the actual sharing behavior
as the need for or the benefits of tracking based applications may only be revealed in




0 Currently no event data at item-level is shared 11 73%
1 Currently some event data shared, but only with restrictions (only with
selected business partners or only selected type of event data)
3 20%
2 Currently event data at item-level is shared, or the organization will
definitely share item-level event data shortly
1 7%
The impact of perceived privacy risks on organizations’ willingness 429
Table 2 Levels of willingness of the interviewed organizations to share item-level event data
Level Description Number Percentage
0 No willingness to share event data: 0 0%
Currently no willingness to share
1 Low willingness to share event data: 10 67%
The willingness is low, though there is no fundamental reluctance. The
sharing would be restricted to a few type of data, products, or business
partners
2 Medium willingness to share event data: 2 13%
There is a willingness to share for some selected kind of data, products
and business partners. Only under some particular circumstances the
restrictions would be revoked
3 High willingness to share event data: 2 13%
There is a high willingness to share with a few specific exceptions
4 Unrestricted willingness to share event data: 1 7%
The willingness to share exists without any restriction
the future. The willingness of companies to share event data, according to the judg-
ment of the respondents, can be described on a five level scale from no willingness to
unrestricted willingness to share event data (Table 2).
Interestingly, in no case the sharing of item level data was ruled out completely.
All companies could think of some conditions under which they would share at least
some data with some business partners. While 80% stated they would not share data
but for a few exceptions, 13% of the companies chose the reverse approach and
claimed to generally allow sharing with a few restrictions as to what or with whom
not to share. The largest share (67%) of companies reported a low willingness to
share, meaning that the conditions under which data is shared are imagined to be
very restrictive.
General restrictions of data sharing When it comes to restrictions regarding orga-
nizations with which data is shared, respondents mentioned limiting sharing to down-
stream partners, while no data with upstream data should be shared at all. Some orga-
nizations can imagine sharing information with all participants of the supply chain,
both up- and downstream. Indirect business partners and competitors were mentioned
as to be excluded from the organizations that data would be shared with.
Regarding the kind of event data to be shared, some organizations are only willing
to share data concerning deliveries and item transitions and only with business part-
ners directly involved in the transaction. Some respondents also expressed the wish
to exclude all data related to production and production processes.
The willingness to share data was higher in those companies that know their sup-
pliers and the suppliers of their suppliers. The willingness to share event data was also
higher for those companies that felt that their goals were well aligned with the goals
of the other supply chain participants. The companies reporting a low willingness to
share were part of large and complex supply chains with many participants.
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Willingness to share event data at item-level per industry While the willingness
to share item-level event data was quite low in the automotive and consumer goods
industry, it was reported to be even less in the pharmaceutical industry and in the
electronics, machinery and factory construction industry.
In the automotive industry the power balance was identified to be decisive to deter-
mine the extent of shared data, besides the perceived risks and trust. The more power
an organization has with respect to its business partners, the lower the willingness to
share will be, while a small amount of power correlates with a high willingness to
share data. The last holds true only in those supply chain settings where a powerful
company forces its business partners to share data. The data analysis of the empirical
study revealed that “weak” organizations are very likely to disclose their item-level
event data to powerful companies in the same supply chain. This behavior is due to the
enacted trading partner’s power. The overall reluctance to share item-level found in
this study is inline with the findings of the study of the BRIDGE project [8]. However,
our study revealed that in spite of the overall reluctance, some “weak” organizations
would comply with a request of a more powerful company in the supply chain in
order to keep the business relationship. Companies in the automotive industry would
appreciate an inventory inaccuracies reduction and a more efficient warehouse man-
agement. Trust in and dependency on business partners are high and could explain
why companies would comply with a sharing request.
In the consumer goods industry, concerns about the price maintenance are preva-
lent. Organizations’ reluctance to share in this industry mainly stem from potential
negative consequences of risks including the threat to be penalized after detection of
inefficiencies or for unfair behavior, the reconstruction of strategic decisions, and the
difficulty in justifying the price. The results of our study are consistent with those of
the study of the BRIDGE project [8] in the finding that the consumer goods industry is
among those industries which are the most willing to share event data. However, our
study is contradictory to the extent of the overall willingness to share. Even though
organizations in the consumer goods industry are relatively more likely to disclose
than organizations in other industries, they are still rather reluctant to share.
In electronics, machinery and factory construction the willingness to share event
data is low. The results from the study suggest that the main reason for the low
willingness is that the interviewees could not see any convincing benefits for their
companies. The perception of potential risks that go along with shared event data is
surprisingly low.
In the pharmaceutical industry a possible reconstruction of strategic decisions, re-
lying on wrong data, and a revelation of distribution channels were perceived as the
most terrific risks. Moreover, the level of trust in the supply chain partners was rather
low. On the contrary to the interviews of the BRIDGE project [8], the interviews of
our empirical study revealed a very low willingness to share event data in the phar-
maceutical industry. The low willingness that we found in our study may be related
to the fact that we conducted the interviews in states without electronic pedigree acts.
Even if an automated counterfeit detection is highly appreciated in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, risks outweigh this benefit.
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4.1.3 Summary and interpretation
These findings suggest that the current level of item-level data sharing is low. This
might also be attributable to a lack of tracking infrastructures and applications that
make sense of the data. The general willingness of companies to share data in the
future (given appropriate infrastructures and applications) can be described as low.
Companies wish to restrict the event data to be shared and control with whom it is
shared and which type of data are disclosed. The results of the study suggests that
companies worry more about which organizations might get their data than about
which types of data is shared. However, this supposition could also be explained by
the unfamiliarity of the respondents with the event data model.
Concerning the actual sharing behavior as well as the overall willingness to share
data, the size and complexity of the supply chain are supposed to be factors that
correlate with the extent of sharing. In small supply chains, in which most or even all
participants are known, the willingness to share was found to be higher than in large
and complex supply chains. This coherence could be attributed to a higher level of
trust in business partners in small supply chains or to an easier way of controlling
the use or misuse of data combined with a higher possibility to identify and penalize
harmful behavior.
4.2 Risks associated with item-level data sharing
The suspected negative consequences of or perceived risks associated with data shar-
ing is one factor that affects the willingness to share item-level data. It can thus be
drawn on to explain the low reported willingness to share. Perceived risks can reduce
a company’s willingness to share data and make them restrict the extent of event
data to be shared even more (e.g. in terms of type, temporal availability, and number
of recipients). Although there are few reports of risks associated with sharing data
on item-level, a number of risks that have been described in the general context of
inter-organizational data sharing can be assumed to apply also for item-level shar-
ing. Potential risks that have been derived from literature are described, followed by
a description of how relevant and threatening the risks were perceived by the study
participants (Sect. 4.2.1). Furthermore, a set of additional risks revealed in the inter-
views which could be relevant for item-level data sharing are presented in Sect. 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Identified risks
Description of identified risks On the basis of a literature review we identified the
following risks:
1. Reconstruction of strategic decisions: The connection of event data from different
locations enables the disclosure and reconstruction of strategic decisions. Sharing
of fine-granular event data increases the visibility of operations for all compa-
nies involved. If confidentiality is not preserved, a competitor could anticipate a
company’s future plans, e.g. an extension of the product range. An extension of
the product range can be estimated if new strategic relationships are built in the
supply chain and by looking at the types of items delivered. An upcoming sales
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campaign of a competitor might be predicted by analyzing demand figures [34].
A higher demand from supply chain partners or the intensification of a strategic
relationship might be a hint for a sales campaign or an entry to a new market.
2. Relying on wrong data: Access to supply chain-wide information may be benefi-
cial to the individual companies, but there is a concern whether the business part-
ners will sincerely share their information. It is assumed that the market of EPC
traces will be vulnerable to moral hazard, to actors who sell “fake traces” [35].
Competitive partners may intentionally manipulate the data they share or even
inject completely false data [36]. Incomplete data limits the reliability of data
analyses. False data, however, like “false traces”, might even negatively affect the
analyses. Inaccurate analyses may result in wrong business decisions and may
have economic repercussions.
3. Threat to be penalized for unfair behavior: Increased visibility not only allows
for the detection of inefficient behavior, but also of unfair behavior, i.e. the “little
tricks” that companies apply to gain a better competitive position. For example, in
case of a supply bottleneck, it is assumed that some buyers have an incentive to
overstate their actual demand in order to gain a better share of the items in short
supply. This behavior might not work anymore if event data is shared on item-
level. In other words, the affected company will not get a higher share of items in
short supply and might not meet its customers’ demands [14]. Another example of
unfair behavior is to induce the suppliers to carry high inventory at their expense
by exaggerating the demand.
4. Lose in a “race to learn”: In an environment where item-level event data is shared,
some organizations might seek to learn with an exploitative intent, e.g. to infer best
practices, or reliable sources of materials. To improve each company’s competitive
advantage, this attitude may lead to a so-called “race to learn” [35]. One company
will win, but the other may not.
5. Loss of information advantages: Disclosing sales information to other organiza-
tions may reduce the effect of so-called information rents from which especially
weaker parties in the supply chain currently profit. A loss of the information rent
may change the relationship of the business partners [37].
6. Revelation of distribution channels: Increased visibility may reveal the distribution
channels and the routes of individual items. With this information terrorists and
potential thieves could estimate when an item is passing a weak point in the supply
chain [7, 19, 21].
7. Threat to be penalized after detection of inefficiencies: As complete event data
allows for a fine-granular view of what happened to individual items and when,
this might allow companies to detect and potentially penalize inefficient behavior
of their business partners, e.g. up to a change of suppliers. Consider the follow-
ing example: One of the most important attributes of an event is its time stamp.
By sharing time stamped events that also contain location information, it becomes
possible to determine when a company’s custody of a product (physical ownership
of the product) starts and when it ends. The time stamps allow the calculation of
how long a specific product was stored in one particular location. With this infor-
mation, “sloppiness” in companies’ operations can be detected and the company
might get penalized for storing the product too long, e.g. in case the delivery is
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Table 3 Perceived threat level of a risk
n/a This risk does not apply to my company
1 This risk has only a small impact on my company’s data sharing policy
2 This risk has quite some impact on my company’s data sharing policy
3 This risk is a decisive factor that hinders my company from sharing item-level event data
4 As long as this risk exists, my company will definitely not share any item-level event data




Reconstruct strategic decisions 93% 3 1 4
Relying on wrong data 71% 1 1 4
Threat to be penalized for unfair behavior 63% 1 1 4
Lose in a “race to learn” 50% 1, 2, 3 1 4
Loss of information advantages 50% 2 1 3
Identify distribution channels 47% 1 1 4
Threat to be penalized after the detection
of inefficiencies
44% 1 1 4
time-critical. An example of this scenario is a company storing too many items
within its store at the expense of another company [38]. The traceability and the
visibility of items would provide the means for other companies to detect capacity
problems and use them to renegotiate conditions.
In order to explore whether these risks are considered as relevant by companies
and to what extent a risk affects a companies willingness to share item-level data, the
study participants were asked to indicate the potential impact of the risk on the data
sharing policy on a 5 point scale (Table 3).
Assessment of identified risks In order to analyze the impact of these seven risks we
asked the interviewees about each identified risk if it applies to their company and
what impact each risk has on their company’s data sharing policy. The interviewees
could rate the impact and the risk level of each risk according to a predefined code
(Table 3). The median, mode, minimum, and maximum was calculated based on this
code (Table 4).
The risk perceived by most companies as relevant is the reconstruction of strategic
decisions (reported by 93%). A high relevance was also attributed to the risk of rely-
ing on wrong data injected by competitors (71%). Being penalized for unfair behavior
is the third most frequent mentioned risk (63%), and perceived as more relevant than
being penalized for inefficiencies (44%). Each risk was perceived to be relevant by at
least 44% of the respondents, meaning that none of the assumed risks is negligible.
Besides being the risk perceived as most relevant, the risk that competitors might
reconstruct strategic relationships was also the risk with largest influence on the shar-
ing behavior of companies. Most companies perceived this risk as so threatening that
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it would severely limit their sharing behavior. The loss of information advantages
was also perceived as quite threatening by many companies. Most companies that
mentioned that risk as relevant assessed it as having some impact on the data shar-
ing policy, but not restricting data sharing as much as the reconstruction of strategic
decisions. The expected impact of a loss in a race to learn on the extent of data shar-
ing varies across respondents, while for all other risks the majority of respondents
found them to have only a minor impact on the sharing policy. For all risks (except
for “loss of information advantages”), the full spectrum of possible impacts on the
data sharing policy—from minor impacts to a complete halt of data sharing—could
be observed. Further analysis revealed that 25% of the organizations will definitely
not share any item-level event data at all, as long as a particular risk exists. 75% of
the organizations in the sample rate at least one risk as a decisive factor hindering the
company from sharing data or even prevents inter-organizational sharing completely.
4.2.2 Newly revealed risks
Besides the risks that were known to exist from literature, study participants also
mentioned a number of further risks that are specific to the sharing of item-level
data:
1. Development of a competitive product: A competitive product might be developed
with the knowledge of suppliers and sub-suppliers. Competitors might get in touch
with top suppliers.
2. Weakening of the bargaining power after disclosure of purchase or supply volume:
A customer could compare its own purchase volume to the purchase volumes of
other customers and calculate its share. This information might be used by strate-
gic buyers to strengthen their bargaining power. Respectively, suppliers could cal-
culate their share of overall supply. This information contributes to determine the
power of a supplier and the dependence of a recipient on a supplier.
3. Difficulty in justifying the price: The sharing of event data could reveal the source
of single items and semi-finished components. The customer could make inquiries
into delivered quantities and prices. The inquiries might enable her/him to claim
a lower price.
4. Concerns about the price maintenance: The disclosure of distribution channels
could enable customers to descry similar products. Costumers may perceive sim-
ilar products as being equivalent, even though the products are not of the same
quality. For instance, similar products could be made up of the same compo-
nents but differ in quality due to different manufacturing techniques. The customer
might not appreciate the more sophisticated manufacturing technique and there-
fore choose the cheaper product or claim a lower price for the more sophisticated
product.
5. Skipping a stage in the supply chain: Intermediate stages in the supply chain might
be skipped if the organizations are acting primarily as intermediaries. For example,
manufacturers might contact customers directly after inferring the buyers contact
details from the data. They might also directly offer repair or maintenance ser-
vices. Particularly small-sized businesses are concerned that they could easily be
substituted or become obsolete.
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6. Loss of know how: Expertise might become accessible to competitors if produc-
tion sequences could be reconstructed (cf. aggregation event [5]) revealing which
components are assembled in which products and in which sequence. Competitors
could use this information to improve their production or to imitate a product.
7. Increased mistrust: The electronic processing of data can contribute to an auto-
matic managing of procedures and to a reduction of the necessity of personal
communication. Some respondents were worried about increasing mistrust and a
decrease of partnership.
4.2.3 Summary and interpretation
The results of this study suggest that most of the newly found risks—and actually
even most risks overall—have their source in parallel streams of the supply chain,
in which companies compete with each other. Companies of the same stage but of
different streams may be competitors that are afraid of revealing any data. Another
thread is the mistrust in other supply chain partners that is expressed by the overall
agreement that business partners or even unknown actors in the supply chain might
use the data to the disadvantage of companies that share.
5 Implications
The reluctance of organizations to share event data at item-level imposes difficult
challenges to the security area. Appropriate measures that mitigate the risks must be
designed in order to gain more trust in sharing data, which is a prerequisite to achieve
the benefits of tracking applications. Designers of privacy and security mechanisms
are challenged to develop concepts that allow limiting the visibility of event data in a
way that specific benefits can be reaped and risks mitigated. A critical success factor
is to provide customized solutions, as the requirements of companies are diverse and
each type of risk may require a different solution concept. The risk perceived as most
severe was the reconstruction of strategic relationships. When examining this risk
more closely, it is apparent that the exact data that is affected and thus the possibilities
to mitigate this risk depend largely on the company and the kind of strategically
important decisions a specific company takes. This scenario dependence can also
be observed for most of the other risks. There is no predefined set of data (types),
conditions or business partners that, when excluded from sharing, would mitigate a
risk for all companies. It is thus required that any measure designed to minimize data
sharing risks must be flexible and adaptable enough to cater for the requirements of
different organizations.
We believe that the presented list of risks is not only useful in designing appropri-
ate privacy and security mechanisms, but also in evaluating existing concepts for their
suitability in the context of item-level data sharing between organizations. Some of
the identified risks translate directly to quality criteria for security mechanisms, such
as the inability to reconstruct strategic relationships, the inability to detect unfair
behavior respective inefficiencies, or the inability to identify distribution channels.
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Apart from using traditional security metrics, being able to demonstrate that a mech-
anism is able to provide these features would be suitable to make research in the
security domain more relevant to a managerial audience.
After having conducted the expert interviews, meetings with system security ex-
perts from academia and industry followed. The discussions brought three basic ways
to light that could help to reap the benefits of tracking applications while minimizing
the aforementioned risks:
1. Devise a fine grained access control system that fulfills the stated requirements.
For example, risks were described in Sect. 4.2 that are connected to the calcula-
tion of how long a specific product is stored in one particular location. This cal-
culation only works precisely if the time stamps at both goods receipt and goods
issue are accessible. Even if access is denied to one part of this time data, many
e-commerce (meta-) services still work. For targeted product recalls, for example,
the goods receipt timestamp is sufficient to know where the product is. Our col-
leagues Zanetti and Capkun already presented a fine-grained access control mech-
anism to detect and prevent the leakage of sensitive business information while
sharing serial-level data [39]. Their solution is composed of a framework for de-
scribing relations between sensitive information (e.g. volumes) and serial-level
data (e.g. both timestamps and the number of data), and of a security architecture
that, based on predefined relations, detects and prevents the leakage of sensitive
information while sharing serial-level data [39].
2. Use methods related to secure multi-party computation that are, to a certain de-
gree, able to compute a result without revealing data [40, 41]. During its execu-
tion, a secure multi-party computation protocol guarantees a predefined level of
security depending on the chosen attacker model (semi-honest or malicious). The
protocol does not (generally) guarantee security on what can be inferred from the
output of the protocol itself. Thus, any function can be considered. Crypto tools to
implement functions in a privacy-preserving way exist, but they can be very im-
practical due to their complexity: it may take a long time to run secure multi-party
protocols for even non-so-complex functions among a relatively small number of
players. For instance, with the solution proposed by Ben-David et al. [42], seven
participants can compute a function that can be represented as a 1024 gate cir-
cuit in almost 10 seconds. If such a computation needs to be carried out for each
tag this would probably take months, maybe even years. In the context of sup-
ply chains, Atallah et al. [43, 44] proposed several privacy-preserving protocols
for capacity allocation, e-auctions, and collaborative planning, forecasting, and
replenishment.
3. Every participant shares data with a trusted third party. Only the trusted third
party has access to the raw data and propagates the results necessary to achieve
the benefits of inter-organizational tracking applications back to the individual
participants. A critical success factor will be how to answer the question of who
would be a suitable, trusted organization that could play such a role, e.g. for a
certain industry. Consider, for example, a pharmaceutical supply chain, in which
pharmaceutical counterfeits are circulating. As Florida and California passed laws
that require pedigrees to be transmitted of all prescriptions drugs, it may seem
likely that governmental institutions may take the role of the trusted third party.
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This may even lead to an advantage for police and customs by being notified im-
mediately to confiscate tampered pharmaceuticals as soon as it becomes evident.
As for the secure computations, another success factor might be to avoid one party
to infer critical information from the results distribute by the third party.
6 Conclusion and outlook
In the study we found that the current sharing of item-level event data as well as the
willingness to share event data is low for the participating companies. Companies
wish to impose many restrictions in terms of data recipients and data types, but the
restrictions vary across companies. As a decisive factor contributing to the low will-
ingness to share data, privacy risks could be identified. There is no general severity
of a risk, but the perceived threat depends on the specific conditions under which a
company operates. The study revealed that there are many and diverse risks asso-
ciated with sharing item-level data. While many of the risks apply as well to data
sharing on an aggregated level, additional risks that are specific to item-level shar-
ing were reported. In case item-level data is shared, the number of potential risks
increases as the information is finer grained and individual items instead of bulks are
visible. The number of risks increases when data is not only shared, but even shared
on item-level.The reconstruction of a company’s strategic decisions and the loss of
information advantages were identified as the risks perceived as most threatening.
A flexible way of describing restrictions and a possibility to enable reasonable shar-
ing with unknown organizations are requirements that need to be taken into account
when designing inter-organizational tracking and data sharing infrastructures.
Trust has been found to be a significant factor that heavily impacts an organiza-
tion’s willingness to share data. The study suggest that the size of the supply chain
and the fact whether most of the other supply chain participants are known, has a
major influence on the willingness to share data. In large and complex supply chains
with many participants, the willingness to share is generally lower than in small sup-
ply chains. Suitable measures for mitigating the identified risks need to be developed
to gain more trust in sharing data. Apart from the three suggested alternatives (access
control system, secure multi-party computation, trusted third part) for achieving data
privacy, different approaches might be needed or perform better.
The study is limited by the small sample size that does not allow to draw general
conclusions. However, we are among the first to explore this area and thus a small
sample size and in-depth interviews seemed to be suitable.
For further exploring the risks associated with data sharing on item-level, a survey
with a larger number of participants would be suitable. It needs to be investigated
which risks are specific to certain industries or supply chain types, so that systems that
fulfill the requirements of specific sets of companies can be designed. Moreover, it
is required to analyze the desired restrictions more precisely and develop appropriate
ways of describing them formally.
We believe that without a detailed understanding of the potential risks associated
with data sharing, no suitable countermeasures can be developed. This paper thus
contributes a set of privacy risks that developers of inter-organizational data sharing
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systems should take into account when developing systems and against which ex-
isting systems can be tested. The set of risks might help a managerial audience to
better understand what consequences data sharing might have and may be used to
state specific requirements for risk mitigation.
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